tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1724832200411147167.post97279291867689741..comments2023-10-19T02:24:24.166-07:00Comments on The Chasm: Intuitions and OntotheologyCarbondale Chasmitehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13594688764570047726noreply@blogger.comBlogger2125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1724832200411147167.post-76752630346980586272009-10-05T19:18:47.724-07:002009-10-05T19:18:47.724-07:00In relating two theses together for a philosophica...In relating two theses together for a philosophical problem, it makes little sense to suggest going back and reading Heidegger without first suggesting what is I have missed. Secondly, the fact that you read him everyday does not entail that you have some greater understanding of ontotheologies without first arguing the point that has been missed. If you want, abstract the claim of an onto-theology from Heidegger and relate it back to the content of moral intuitions. There are other ways of arguing this same point. We could just object to Rossian intuitionism and argue this same point from a historical relativism about how our moral intuitions are conditioned, or brought about. We would have the logically equivalent objection, amounting to the same thing. Yet, we can take a cue from Heidegger, though--putting into contact a way of framing this relativism charge about moral intuitions in a way that puts various philosophies into contact in a striking way. Heidegger makes historicity relevant to all types of philosophizing, and this would affect moral philosophy in some way. Wouldn't it? Take how ethics is normally construed. <br />We might be so inclined to think that history no longer matters when moral philosophers like Nagel or Kant assume a certain timelessness about ethical inquiry in which ethics is independent conceptual attempt to bring about a theory that explains why actions are morally right/wrong, and why we should find moral considerations authoritative. This "independence" from history largely makes ethics a look naïve or overly simplistic for any Continental thinker that assumes historicity. Immediately, Gadamer and Heidegger come to mind, so does the later Husserl. This historicity would have claims about how exactly certain intuitions take shape given the hermeneutics of the age, that is, the ontotheology specifically at work in which a moral agent has a moral intuition. <br /><br />You’ll notice that the modern period thinks of morality only in terms of actions. There is no language of virtue, and vice for that matter. Why is it that morality has moved to be thought of in terms of the law/rules and not virtues/vices? Is it any wonder that these rule-generating moralities (i.e. both consequentialism and Kantian deontological theories) become more popular with the rise of the state or even the success of a new Enlightenment science? Heideggerian ontotheologies could very well spell the limit of ethics’ claim of independence.Carbondale Chasmitehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13594688764570047726noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1724832200411147167.post-54431366236102859002009-10-04T09:50:22.070-07:002009-10-04T09:50:22.070-07:00As Heidegger might say, go back and read Aristotle...As Heidegger might say, go back and read Aristotle for fifteen years or so. <br />Then read some Heidegger.<br />I make a point of reading him everyday.<br />For Heidegger, we can agree, the written word is vastly inferior to the spoken word, and even language (itself a "being") is suspect.<br />In ten years or so it might make perfect sense.<br />All the best.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com