I attempt to overcome the chasm, the divide, between many philosophical traditions. Maintaining traditions that don't talk to any other traditions makes thinking stale.
Saturday, May 31, 2008
Intuitionism External Moral Order
Darwall defined the internalist conception in which rational intuitionists accept S's acceptance of a normative proposition as true only if they are moved by its truth. This immediately implies that since I have been exploring Ross for a while that if I follow Ross, I am committed to an external moral order of normative facts to which our intuitions are directed towards. It is this independent and external moral order that moves us through intuitions. However, I am wondering if I have to accept moral facts in this way, or is there another way to cash out the explanation for what our intuitions are about? Can intuitionism be a substantive theory without the requirement of mind-independent normative facts?
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