Genetic Phenomenology

I am reading a book by Janet Donohoe. The title escapes me currently. However, the current interpretation of Husserl's later period to a genetic phenomenology allows for a dynamism and level of analysis that the static phenomenology of the early Husserl cannot. I am becoming increasingly aware of how intersubjectivity may factor into our moral reasoning. Allow me some space for leniency. I might not get this right the first time.

If moral realism is the position that values somehow exist independently of my mind, then the independence of moral values must subsist somehow. I am thinking that the intersubjective nature of moral experience may engender their reality. I think it is wrong to say that moral values exist as a natural kind since most attempts at reductionism of value fail our common-sense intuitions of moral values. Values seem incommensurable, but they must -- like all things -- be caused in some manner.

I could be completely off base here. Only time will tell, and right now, I wish I spoke and read German having access to the Husserl Archives at Leuven.

VP