John Searle came to Vancouver. As such, I trekked over to UBC to hear him. In the same theatre that afforded me the opportunity of hearing Peter Singer, Searle stood on stage unwavering as a speech act theorist. Searle gave the unbridled passionate speech about how natural sciences unify around a model or principle of a mind-independent world. For chemistry, it is the chemical bond, and for physics, it is the atom. For the question regarding social ontology and the status of social things, it is the status-function declaration.
Status-function declarations, as far as I understood him, designate a collective recognition of our representing X because we think of X as being represented as X. So, we think of money as being money only because we participate in the collective recognition of X being represented in our minds as money. As such, status-declarations explain why it is we have social things, and gives us an organizing principle for a theory of social things.
Searle was a little confusing when it came to how status-function declarations related to morality. I asked him in front of everyone if there was an a unifying status-function declaration for morality, and pressed how he might answer the 'why be moral' question. He had offered that status-function declarations of friendship provide the norms for being a friend, yet I couldn't find any reason why status-function declarations should be seen as reaons why I abide by norms. They do well to explain how it is that moral agents internalize a moral code, but beyond that, they would only amount to something like the following:
(1) Being a good friend is collectively recognized as having characteristics F1 to Fn only because we think of F1-Fn as being represented as F1-Fn (we might add some contextual constraint on these norms as well)
However, (1) doesn't tell us why I ought to be a good friend. It only informs me of the status of how friendship is regarded by others. If there are norms suggested in the common representation of the status of the friendship characteristics F1-Fn, then this adherence to these norms is not reason-generating, but only habitually practiced. Of course, Searle can say that he is not addressing the question of seeking how we determine the content of moral reasons. He would just say that he is looking for the conceptual underpinnings of why social things are the way they are, yet Searle then shouldn't suggest that deontic implications follow from his view without giving us a story of how the ontological status of duties gives us reasons to follow implicitly from the social ontology.
(1) might be compatible with a relativism as exemplified by Harman's account. Yet, even in Harman, I am left dissatisfied with how norms and values in context give me reasons to do what they describe--so, the same problem cuts across both views, namely, that contextually functioning rules fail to produce morally-guiding reasons; instead, they only produce functioning rules because those rules are habitually ingrained in collective recognition of their status.
So, yeah... I was mad at Searle for failing to answer my question!!!
I think that a colleague of mine said it best when the talk sounded like a "analytic recasting of Foucault."
Thursday, March 27, 2008
Monday, March 10, 2008
No Ethics for the Drowned
Our President is unethical. His moral compass and religiosity are but blinders to the abhorrence of profound immorality disguised in debauched and callous reason--this is what he either calls national security or piety.
If someone can follow this line of thought all the way through, then I assume that such a person of reasonableness could find no fault in my claim. Of all true moral propositions, the truest is that each moral person has a right of inviolable dignity and that to violate that dignity, to use another human being as a pure means to an end, cannot suffice for any moral standard. For morality requires above all else, the respect to another human being's dignity is sacrosanct, meaning nothing more than to respect each other as people who set our own ends. If this be one agreed upon standard of morality, then torture as violating human dignity is morally and unquestionable wrong, and the fact that my President vetoed an anti-torture bill exemplifies that the Republican Party has no place being the party of morality.
It is far beyond repugnant; it is downright fucking unbelievable. If any of you my friends condone the CIA using water torture, then you -- like G. W. Bush -- are immoral, and share highly undesirable aims of what counts as the moral Good with me. Torture violates human dignity, plain and simple. It is immoral, and now, it makes me so fucking furious to think that my President has shown the world his true character.
Friday, February 15, 2008
Phenomenological Descriptions of Hope
I should qualify that this post isn't a sustained philosophical piece of writing, but an exploratory inquiry into the phenomena of hope. In my lived experience of the political, I keep seeing hope tied to contexts as I stress over the Democratic nomination for the US Presidency. As usual, there is usually a lovely inspiration from my wife's beautiful mind pervading my philosophical attention.
I was seated next to my wife on campus. I was reading an article of Clinton criticizing the ambiguity of Obama's speeches. It was noteworthy since the speech happened somewhere in Youngstown, OH (the exact area around Ohio where we are from originally). Clinton's message was simple: Hope doesn't put food on the dinner table, nor pay your stack of bills. My wife snickered and said something to the effect that hope is a more powerful message. She said that hope would make people do something for themselves rather than awaiting the government to do something one should do for oneself. I thought to myself there may be something to her intuition about hope that is phenomenologically descriptive. So, the question concerning me here what would a phenomenological description of hope look like?
Hope phenomenologically reveals itself as a hope of one's own--that is, there's something about hope that makes someone pursue it. Political hopes are practical in this regard. Moreover, it's tied to someone's authenticity, even when people are mostly in the mode of inauthentic herd mentality. Someone has decided to have a resolute determination for themselves, and at this point, the object of hope molds its believer. Like a traveler hitchhiking, hope stands off at the distant horizon as a pristine example of the socio-political world as a "could-be." Our actions become absorbed in the experience of the political as a "could-be." We pursue what is most likely resembling the could-be.
Promisemaking is a will-be. The politician promises the world will resemble their own vision as it is promised as. If you vote for me, the promisemaking act guarantees the state of affairs will be thus, yet, promisemaking is deficient with respect to the contingency of human action. Hope is couched in terms of generality where a theme is just a could-be, and to be truly hopeful, one has to hope that contingency of action works in the favor of what might not come to pass. As such, could-be is a more honest and prudent approach since it acknowledges the vision of the future as better, but doesn't specific too much on the content as will-be promises. Hence, will-be is a passing attempt of someone to tell you how they will rule. Promises qua will-be is a telling what "others want to hear" whereas hope invites others into its being since so many can hope that the world "could be" this way.
If you would like to respond to this post, then I have two questions plaguing my mind:
Do you think there is another phenomenological description of hope that better suits the how hope appears in our lived experience or not?
What type of social ontology is supported by hope?
I was seated next to my wife on campus. I was reading an article of Clinton criticizing the ambiguity of Obama's speeches. It was noteworthy since the speech happened somewhere in Youngstown, OH (the exact area around Ohio where we are from originally). Clinton's message was simple: Hope doesn't put food on the dinner table, nor pay your stack of bills. My wife snickered and said something to the effect that hope is a more powerful message. She said that hope would make people do something for themselves rather than awaiting the government to do something one should do for oneself. I thought to myself there may be something to her intuition about hope that is phenomenologically descriptive. So, the question concerning me here what would a phenomenological description of hope look like?
Hope phenomenologically reveals itself as a hope of one's own--that is, there's something about hope that makes someone pursue it. Political hopes are practical in this regard. Moreover, it's tied to someone's authenticity, even when people are mostly in the mode of inauthentic herd mentality. Someone has decided to have a resolute determination for themselves, and at this point, the object of hope molds its believer. Like a traveler hitchhiking, hope stands off at the distant horizon as a pristine example of the socio-political world as a "could-be." Our actions become absorbed in the experience of the political as a "could-be." We pursue what is most likely resembling the could-be.
Promisemaking is a will-be. The politician promises the world will resemble their own vision as it is promised as. If you vote for me, the promisemaking act guarantees the state of affairs will be thus, yet, promisemaking is deficient with respect to the contingency of human action. Hope is couched in terms of generality where a theme is just a could-be, and to be truly hopeful, one has to hope that contingency of action works in the favor of what might not come to pass. As such, could-be is a more honest and prudent approach since it acknowledges the vision of the future as better, but doesn't specific too much on the content as will-be promises. Hence, will-be is a passing attempt of someone to tell you how they will rule. Promises qua will-be is a telling what "others want to hear" whereas hope invites others into its being since so many can hope that the world "could be" this way.
If you would like to respond to this post, then I have two questions plaguing my mind:
Do you think there is another phenomenological description of hope that better suits the how hope appears in our lived experience or not?
What type of social ontology is supported by hope?
Thursday, February 14, 2008
Recovering the World
Phenomenology is described at an attempt to arrive at the world of immediate contact. In phenomenology, the world is already there prior to any theorizing about it. As many of you may well know, the idea that the world is already there, and that its being there constitutes our relation to it is abandoned in more naturalistic theories. For naturalists, there are entities in the world best described in terms of the natural sciences, and entities are mind-independent. While the world is independent of itself in our field of experience in phenomenology, our experience of the world is something we must retrieve actively.
Now, phenomenology doesn't achieve causal accounts. Instead, phenomenology identifies the fundamental relation of being-in-the-world and attempts to retrieve that understandng for us. I'm wondering whether the fundamental attempt to retrieve essences of the world is in a way causal. How far do you push the thesis that phenomenology identifies constitutive a priori facts that play no causal role because when describing the world?
Now, phenomenology doesn't achieve causal accounts. Instead, phenomenology identifies the fundamental relation of being-in-the-world and attempts to retrieve that understandng for us. I'm wondering whether the fundamental attempt to retrieve essences of the world is in a way causal. How far do you push the thesis that phenomenology identifies constitutive a priori facts that play no causal role because when describing the world?
Tuesday, February 12, 2008
New Work in Continental Philosophy
Every so often, B. Leiter posts on areas of work being done in different philosophical fields, and I feel it is about time the question gets put to Contiental Philosophy: What is some of the exciting work being done in Continental Philosophy? I feel I want to know what people are doing in Continental Philosophy. So, if you visit this blog and happen, like me, to be a graduate student in philosophy, then tell us the area you're working on.
For instance, I have noted a dearth of Continental phenomenology amongst those appealing to moral phenomenology in Anglo-American ethics. Essentially, the definition of phenomenology offered is something more in line with a Nagel-ian what-is-it-like-to-be-X. As such, there is no broad knowledge of a consciousness as taking on an object in the Husserlian sense. Instead, phenomenology is only the "seems" part of the seems/is distinction often found in philosophy of mind. As such, I've proposed to take a look at questions of Anglo-American ethics. I want to see what undergirds these traditional problems -- such as a conception of practical reason or the incommensurability of values. I argue that the phenomenological reduction whence employed in looking at such problems can better guide our ethical theorizing.
In recent years, I know that the debate on how to take Heidegger has been raging in regards to whether or not Heidegger's phenomenology amounts to a form of transcendence or is it better understood as an existential phenomenology. But again, these are areas of scholarship that are currently beyond me right now.
So what are the current areas of continental philosophy that are intriguing to many?
For instance, I have noted a dearth of Continental phenomenology amongst those appealing to moral phenomenology in Anglo-American ethics. Essentially, the definition of phenomenology offered is something more in line with a Nagel-ian what-is-it-like-to-be-X. As such, there is no broad knowledge of a consciousness as taking on an object in the Husserlian sense. Instead, phenomenology is only the "seems" part of the seems/is distinction often found in philosophy of mind. As such, I've proposed to take a look at questions of Anglo-American ethics. I want to see what undergirds these traditional problems -- such as a conception of practical reason or the incommensurability of values. I argue that the phenomenological reduction whence employed in looking at such problems can better guide our ethical theorizing.
In recent years, I know that the debate on how to take Heidegger has been raging in regards to whether or not Heidegger's phenomenology amounts to a form of transcendence or is it better understood as an existential phenomenology. But again, these are areas of scholarship that are currently beyond me right now.
So what are the current areas of continental philosophy that are intriguing to many?
Monday, February 11, 2008
Zahavi's Routledge Entry
There is a very good introduction to phenomenology written by Dan Zahavi, arguably one of the most important Husserl scholars around. It has a good review of the areas of agreement between figures of phenomenological canon. I especially like the beginning reference to Ricoeur calling all phenomenology after Husserl the legacy of "Husserlian heresies." I'll have to look up this reference since my qualifying paper for my MA this term argues more in favor for a transcendental phenomenology over what I distinguish from a existential phenomenology.
Zahavi's Phenomenology Piece for Routledge originally linked off of Online Philosophy Papers blog.
Zahavi's Phenomenology Piece for Routledge originally linked off of Online Philosophy Papers blog.
Canadia "Symposium" Call for Papers
Badiou represents an important point in contemporary Continental thought. He employs set theory, historical analysis of traditional Continental thinkers, including Rousseau, Marx, Heidegger, and Deleuze, and his own theoretical meditations in order to think through some of the foundational concepts of multiplicity, “the one” or “counting as one,” the world, subjectivity, and the event. He believes that philosophy is possible only when it is de-sutured from the events of mathematics, poetry, politics, and love. We welcome papers around these various aspects of Badiou’s work. Also, we welcome papers attempting to answer some of the following questions: What is the significance of Badiou’s work for the Continental/analytic divide in contemporary philosophy? What is the relation between subjects and events, and is Badiou’s account sufficient? Are there worlds that can resist Badiou’s logic or counting? Can one think of events on micro and macro levels? These questions are meant to stimulate ideas, but they are by no means comprehensive. All papers focused on Badiou’s work are welcome.
CALL FOR PAPERS / APPEL DE COMMUNICATION
Symposium: Canadian Journal of Continental Philosophy Call for Papers ~ Appel d’articles
Alain Badiou: Being, Events, and Philosophy
Symposium: Canadian Journal of Continental Philosophy will dedicate an upcoming issue to the emerging thought of the French philosopher Alain Badiou. With the publication of Being and the Event and Logiques des mondes (Logics of Worlds: Being and Event II), Badiou represents an important point in contemporary Continental thought. He employs set theory, historical analysis of traditional Continental thinkers, including Rousseau, Marx, Heidegger, and Deleuze, and his own theoretical meditations in order to think through some of the foundational concepts of multiplicity, “the one” or “counting as one,” the world, subjectivity, and the event. He believes that philosophy is possible only when it is de-sutured from the events of mathematics, poetry, politics, and love. We welcome papers around these various aspects of Badiou’s work. Also, we welcome papers attempting to answer some of the following questions: What is the significance of Badiou’s work for the Continental/analytic divide in contemporary philosophy? What is the relation between subjects and events, and is Badiou’s account sufficient? Are there worlds that can resist Badiou’s logic or counting? Can one think of events on micro and macro levels? These questions are meant to stimulate ideas, but they are by no means comprehensive. All papers focused on Badiou’s work are welcome.
SUBMISSION REQUIREMENTS:
Papers may be submitted in both French and English and should be between 5000 and 6000 words. Please double-space all submissions. The issue will be published as the Fall 2008 issue. Please submit two hard copies or an electronic copy of your paper by March 30, 2008 to the address below. Notifications of acceptance will be sent after the deadline.
Antonio Calcagno, Guest Editor, Symposium
Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, King’s College in the University of Western Ontario
266 Epworth Avenue, London, ON N6A 2M3, CANADA
calcagnoantonio@yahoo.com
Sunday, February 10, 2008
Jonah Lehrer and Neuroscience
I found an interesting article arguing that reductionism in neuroscience ignores the subjective experience. Now, as a phenomenologist following in line with Husserl, I cannot help but think this article is great for a wider audience. Enjoy.
Lehrer's article with the LA Times
Lehrer's article with the LA Times
Inspired by Peter Railton...
Suppose there is a couple, a deeply devoted couple whom everyone agrees exemplifies the moral virtues of marriage. Each partner is steadfast, loyal and sensitive to the others needs. One day, the husband is asked about his commitment to his wife by his best bro over a glass of beer. His friend asks how is it they are so right for each other. He responds in kind, "I realize I have a duty to my wife to be sensitive to her needs and act so accordingly" Let us imagine that the wife came upon him, standing behind him for some odd reason. Maybe, she saw him in the window and walked this way from the store into the bar to surprise her husband. What would the wife respond to the husband's claim of simply recognizing he has a duty to his wife. It is rather cold, impersonal and from the outset seems to undermine the value of their respective commitment each has towards the other.
It is a conceptual feature of practical reasons given for justifying actions that to talk morally about situations is to abstract them in part from their situational content and to subsume them into general acts or rules of morality. This practice, though necessary for doing moral philosophy, undermines and alienates how each would feel towards the other. The wife may want her husband to act in the exemplary manner he does because he loves her. That should be "reason enough." From what the husband said, he has given the practical reasons why he is steadfast, loyal and sensitive to his wife neesds, yet it is insensitive, alienating the wife from her husband.
What is going on here? The moral point of view talks about agents and their reasons for acting as justifications for why they act. Is this moral point of view appeal to the intuition that morality is undermining, and alienates the wife from her husband. Is there a solution?
I think there is a solution. I want to claim that practical reasoning involves representational understanding, that is, the ability to represent the viewpoint of another. It is a conscious act of understanding to situate yourself in "someone else's shoes", and for that reason whenever someone claims a practical reason, a feature of that practical reasoning is its origin in terms of representing the viewpoint of others. This is, what I call, the subsumption of representation view in which particular people, the situation of being in a relationship with a husband and wife, and particular factual and situational understanding, are subsumed under a general principle. I borrow this from Kant's idea of a reflective judgment where the particular situation before us has its origin in a greater representation than the final judgment displays.
When the husband gives his justification for why it is that he is sensitive, a basic deontological answer of duty, the conceptual landscape that enables him to form that belief is enriched with the active attempt of representation and subsumption necessary for moral reasoning. I have yet to "flesh" this out into a coherent framework for what a practical reason is.
I am firmly a cognitivist (maybe enjoining to the label of internalism is in order as well), believing that the reason for not doing X is a motivation for not doing X. However, the ability to get to that determination involves the enriched landscape of emotions, sensitivity and representation characteristic of what it is to be moral. Being moral, I argue, is nothing more than having a greater ability of the imagination to represent the viewpoint of another.
It is a conceptual feature of practical reasons given for justifying actions that to talk morally about situations is to abstract them in part from their situational content and to subsume them into general acts or rules of morality. This practice, though necessary for doing moral philosophy, undermines and alienates how each would feel towards the other. The wife may want her husband to act in the exemplary manner he does because he loves her. That should be "reason enough." From what the husband said, he has given the practical reasons why he is steadfast, loyal and sensitive to his wife neesds, yet it is insensitive, alienating the wife from her husband.
What is going on here? The moral point of view talks about agents and their reasons for acting as justifications for why they act. Is this moral point of view appeal to the intuition that morality is undermining, and alienates the wife from her husband. Is there a solution?
I think there is a solution. I want to claim that practical reasoning involves representational understanding, that is, the ability to represent the viewpoint of another. It is a conscious act of understanding to situate yourself in "someone else's shoes", and for that reason whenever someone claims a practical reason, a feature of that practical reasoning is its origin in terms of representing the viewpoint of others. This is, what I call, the subsumption of representation view in which particular people, the situation of being in a relationship with a husband and wife, and particular factual and situational understanding, are subsumed under a general principle. I borrow this from Kant's idea of a reflective judgment where the particular situation before us has its origin in a greater representation than the final judgment displays.
When the husband gives his justification for why it is that he is sensitive, a basic deontological answer of duty, the conceptual landscape that enables him to form that belief is enriched with the active attempt of representation and subsumption necessary for moral reasoning. I have yet to "flesh" this out into a coherent framework for what a practical reason is.
I am firmly a cognitivist (maybe enjoining to the label of internalism is in order as well), believing that the reason for not doing X is a motivation for not doing X. However, the ability to get to that determination involves the enriched landscape of emotions, sensitivity and representation characteristic of what it is to be moral. Being moral, I argue, is nothing more than having a greater ability of the imagination to represent the viewpoint of another.
Obama, Canadians and Implosion
I know that this is a space reserved for philosophy, but my thoughts have meandered as of late to the upcomer and underdog for the Democratic Primary for US President -- my favorite -- Barack Obama. Not only does his name sound like a Bounty Hunter from the Star Wars galaxy, but his educated and well-mannered tone foster in my heart an optimism I haven't felt since I began studying politics long ago (my second undergrad major was in Political Science).
In my heart of hearts, I feel he can do it. On Super Tuesday, Feb 5th, he carried a majority of the states. Today, he carried all 3 primaries: Nebraska, Louisania, Washington State and the Virgin Islands. What his victories tell me is he can reach and grab the attention of Republican dominated rural states. I feel this comes from his message of union and hope. His politics may be less liberal than I would hope, but if he can heal the great divide of liberal/conservative, Democrat/Republican, then there is a chance I can feel pride in my home once again.
Now, I often am obsessed with phenomenology, but it should be said that I am somewhat more of an ethicist right now. Perhaps, if I do get into a PhD program andmy research interests change, this will change. However, the research strength of my university is in its tremendous experts in ethics, meta-ethics and moral psychology. As such, I am at my best when doing ethics, and so it is not a far stretch of the imagination to hear an ethicist speculating about a better hope for America. Ethicists are a worrisome bunch about "what ought to be the case"
Canadians often refer to being the neighbor of America as "having an elephant as a neighbor." Most of my colleagues are liberal academics like myself, and BC is a pretty liberal place. Given this, my anecdotes of note are suggestive of a small representation of Canadian opinions concerning the United States. I find it funny that given these conditions and how liberal Hillary Clinton is believed to be over Barack Obama that the majority of Canadian colleagues I have talked to want Obama over Hillary. There is something untrustworthy about a politician who is so scripted! This criticism has come up more than once.
Jean Baudrillard has said that traditional categories of political space have imploded into other social categories. This idea of implosion in relation to politics has seen a collapse of entertainment and politics. In fact, they are pretty much the same thing anymore. We are supposedly entertained by the drama of a campaign trail, and part of this entertainiment is the scripted responses we get from our candidates. You could say we almost expect the answers they give before they give them like Hamlet pondering "whether 'tis nobler in the mind to suffer the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune, or take arms against a sea of troubles, and by opposing, end them." Like the return of a festival, as Gadamer would describe it, we expect the same routine, the same performative utterances to be played out before us. Obama has defied such performative expectation.
When Obama started gaining my attention, it was from the 200,000 college kids that added themselves to the Facebook group wanting him for President. At several speeches and debates, Obama has been lively and engaging. Often, you can see him no longer looking at the teleprompter. He is spontaneous with words pouring from his heart, or so I believe. As a philosopher, I can acknowledge the force and conviction I have for his sincerity. I can always be proven wrong, and therefore must revise my beliefs. However, I have no evidence to suggest otherwise, and from everything I have heard I will consider myself justified prima facie in believing that Obama is a man who cares far above the anticipated scripted narrative of Hillary Clinton's persona.
Besides, apparently Obama was moved by Nietzsche, Sartre and a few other philosophers as reported by the New York Times
NYT Article on Obama
In my heart of hearts, I feel he can do it. On Super Tuesday, Feb 5th, he carried a majority of the states. Today, he carried all 3 primaries: Nebraska, Louisania, Washington State and the Virgin Islands. What his victories tell me is he can reach and grab the attention of Republican dominated rural states. I feel this comes from his message of union and hope. His politics may be less liberal than I would hope, but if he can heal the great divide of liberal/conservative, Democrat/Republican, then there is a chance I can feel pride in my home once again.
Now, I often am obsessed with phenomenology, but it should be said that I am somewhat more of an ethicist right now. Perhaps, if I do get into a PhD program andmy research interests change, this will change. However, the research strength of my university is in its tremendous experts in ethics, meta-ethics and moral psychology. As such, I am at my best when doing ethics, and so it is not a far stretch of the imagination to hear an ethicist speculating about a better hope for America. Ethicists are a worrisome bunch about "what ought to be the case"
Canadians often refer to being the neighbor of America as "having an elephant as a neighbor." Most of my colleagues are liberal academics like myself, and BC is a pretty liberal place. Given this, my anecdotes of note are suggestive of a small representation of Canadian opinions concerning the United States. I find it funny that given these conditions and how liberal Hillary Clinton is believed to be over Barack Obama that the majority of Canadian colleagues I have talked to want Obama over Hillary. There is something untrustworthy about a politician who is so scripted! This criticism has come up more than once.
Jean Baudrillard has said that traditional categories of political space have imploded into other social categories. This idea of implosion in relation to politics has seen a collapse of entertainment and politics. In fact, they are pretty much the same thing anymore. We are supposedly entertained by the drama of a campaign trail, and part of this entertainiment is the scripted responses we get from our candidates. You could say we almost expect the answers they give before they give them like Hamlet pondering "whether 'tis nobler in the mind to suffer the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune, or take arms against a sea of troubles, and by opposing, end them." Like the return of a festival, as Gadamer would describe it, we expect the same routine, the same performative utterances to be played out before us. Obama has defied such performative expectation.
When Obama started gaining my attention, it was from the 200,000 college kids that added themselves to the Facebook group wanting him for President. At several speeches and debates, Obama has been lively and engaging. Often, you can see him no longer looking at the teleprompter. He is spontaneous with words pouring from his heart, or so I believe. As a philosopher, I can acknowledge the force and conviction I have for his sincerity. I can always be proven wrong, and therefore must revise my beliefs. However, I have no evidence to suggest otherwise, and from everything I have heard I will consider myself justified prima facie in believing that Obama is a man who cares far above the anticipated scripted narrative of Hillary Clinton's persona.
Besides, apparently Obama was moved by Nietzsche, Sartre and a few other philosophers as reported by the New York Times
NYT Article on Obama
Friday, February 8, 2008
Assumptions About Doing Continental Philosophy
For the first time ever, I am making my base assumptions of how to proceed in Continental Philosophy (CP herein, CP-ers for “Continental Philosophers”). Here's how I think to navigate the Divide and renew interest in CP. This is basically a rant internalizing the healthy criticism I have received from many Analytics.
For me, philosophy comes down to arguments and an analytic attitude to know when someone is feeding you sophistry or genuine arguments. Essentially, what this means is that one can view CP in this way and defy all pigeon-holing from those that think CP is nonsensical. This amounts to rethinking CP canon with such authors as like Blanchot and Derrida. One doesn't dismiss them from not making sense. Instead, I recommend that CP-ers learn to write and do philosophy analytically. Unknown to many analytic philosophers, there is a history of dialectic argumentations in CP-ers that is never fully illuminated by how they are often approached by CP-ers ourselves.
The approach CP-ers take when writing on these CP thinkers often fail to push forward an argument clearly available for analysis. As CP-ers, this may make our case harder to make, but there are others doing good work in CP that are overlooked. For instance, Follesdal's JPHIL 1966 article on Husserl's Notion of Noema is a classic piece in Husserl scholarship, appears in J PHIL and meets all the expectations of good philosophical writing. In fact, I argue this piece should be emulated as a way of doing CP. The success of CP turns on CP-ers having the ability to explain CP in terms of arguments. For instance, a good CP-er and scholar of Levinas should be able to put Levinas' thought into the context of a dialectic. If one is a defender of his, then one will have to argue why ethics is a first philosophy and that my encounter with the other is transcendent. The better one can achieve mastery over what arguments are made in CP, the better CP will be in the future.
Finally, the fact that CP-ers want to talk to Analytics but can't do it effectively is another piss poor sign that something has gone seriously wrong. This is what I bring to the table other than being an Ethicist. Being schooled in the Analytic tradition allows me to know where other people are coming from, see arguments and work within a framework as the rest of the profession. I assume this is the best way to work, and my work on Heidegger and Husserl has benefited tremendously from these base assertions.
The insistence of argumentation is pushing those interested in CP to do actual philosophy. Such assertions are consistent overall with the pedagogical assumptions in teaching critical thinking, and the ideals we strive to emulate for in writing in our courses in every philosophy department worldwide. I would never TA a course in which the instructor attempted to emulate Derrida-like reasoning in its approach to writing. Yet, I would be very interested to TA a course in which Derrida's points were presented as arguments even though this last point of presenting his ideas would have him turning in his grave.
Tuesday, February 5, 2008
Philosophy Annuals
Brian Leiter is esteeming the Philosophy Annuals which for the past 25 years pick the best 10 philosophy papers a year. While the aim is good, selecting the most insightful and challenging papers in a given year, this is a daunting task. I scanned the pages from volume XXIV to 1978, and I found one article on Nietzsche and morality. The rest, as far as I can tell only serve to foster the bigoted attempt of analytic philosophers to push away Continental Philosophy into the gutter.
My question is simple: How can the editorial board read philosophy in a different language if most of them may have submitted their foreign language requirement for logic?
My question is simple: How can the editorial board read philosophy in a different language if most of them may have submitted their foreign language requirement for logic?
Friday, December 7, 2007
Applications of Philosophy, Quite Literally
I am thoroughly ecstatic! I actually have managed the impossible feat of finishing two of my nine PhD applications. These applications have taken almost a month's time, and I am still ironing out the kinks to my writing sample--an entire semester long affair. I will have the esteemed privilege of getting feedback from Andrew Feenberg, Canadian Research Chair in Philosophy of Technology, and renowned Heidegger scholar trained by Marcuse himself. Of course, this is a privilege coming with the price of meeting his criticism of my writing sample right before they are sent out. My writing sample and finishing up my Plato paper while meeting the grading deadlines of my tutorials. I have yet to supervise the giving of their final exam.
Whew! Wipes brow.
Although I do not know how many people actually read this blog, but heh, that's my philosophical life thus far. Almost done with the MA.
Whew! Wipes brow.
Although I do not know how many people actually read this blog, but heh, that's my philosophical life thus far. Almost done with the MA.
Wednesday, November 7, 2007
Opposite of My View on Torture
It comes as no surprise this moral philosopher has published such an abhorrent view in an international journal. Most of the time, if "international" appears in the scholarly journal's title, then that should signify how "unrecognizable" that journal is. (I have no qualms about committing ad hominems in my own blogspace. The virtue comes in recognizing one's own pronouncement as a fallacy)
A Defense of Torture
In response to this article, I can only claim that we have competing intuitions. I start from the intuition that for principles to matter and spell out exactly how we ought to act, they must be able to stand on their own. Even if I were a particularist or contextualist, the role of principles as spelled out in a codified law, such as due-process still stand on their own feet without collapsing them away by offering the intuition of ticking-time bomb scenarios as ultimate defeasibility of my position. The reason why I cannot accomodate the intuition supporting torture is that I do not think the intuition can be accomodated---period, end of story. I find myself repeating myself on this point: To truly value a principle, such as in our jurisprudence, is to think such a principle so laudable that the value endorsed speaks about who our character as a nation. This may sound like rhetorical nonesense, but I will explain.
A character of a person is determined by the set of principles and values that person endorses. The set of endorsed values form the practical identity people see as a salient criteria used in judging people morally. For example, if Jones is honest all the time and he lied about X, then we should think something is up for why he lied about X. Similarly, if he then changed from an honest person to constantly lying, Jones' honest reputation and good character become undermined by the complete change of character. Let's assume his lying is based on endorsing the value of his wants and desires over others no matter what. In fact, he firmly admits that committing himself to principles of putting himself ahead of others, including in truth-telling, is something he sees himself as neglecting from years of being an upstanding honest person. He acquires a new character somewhere over time. Thus, practical identity is a moral feature of our experience used in judging the character of moral agents. By extension, this holds for a state.
Practically speaking, the United States is like Jones. When in times past if the United States called attention to human rights violations, then the world would listen. Now, the Junta in Burma are slapping down democracy and our want to call attention to this in international circles is defeated by our inconsistency on the one hand of judging others to be violators of human rights when at the same time the US cannot honor commitments of non-torture. This is an inconsistency in what we say we value from how we act. Our practical identity of a free nation is supplanted by the truer picture of our character. In essence, our practical identity is held as a salient feature for morally judging the US. This is a consequence of the inconsistency between a nation founded on the rule of law with those in power causing the split between the good principles we value from putting their wants ahead of what is truly morally good.
A Defense of Torture
In response to this article, I can only claim that we have competing intuitions. I start from the intuition that for principles to matter and spell out exactly how we ought to act, they must be able to stand on their own. Even if I were a particularist or contextualist, the role of principles as spelled out in a codified law, such as due-process still stand on their own feet without collapsing them away by offering the intuition of ticking-time bomb scenarios as ultimate defeasibility of my position. The reason why I cannot accomodate the intuition supporting torture is that I do not think the intuition can be accomodated---period, end of story. I find myself repeating myself on this point: To truly value a principle, such as in our jurisprudence, is to think such a principle so laudable that the value endorsed speaks about who our character as a nation. This may sound like rhetorical nonesense, but I will explain.
A character of a person is determined by the set of principles and values that person endorses. The set of endorsed values form the practical identity people see as a salient criteria used in judging people morally. For example, if Jones is honest all the time and he lied about X, then we should think something is up for why he lied about X. Similarly, if he then changed from an honest person to constantly lying, Jones' honest reputation and good character become undermined by the complete change of character. Let's assume his lying is based on endorsing the value of his wants and desires over others no matter what. In fact, he firmly admits that committing himself to principles of putting himself ahead of others, including in truth-telling, is something he sees himself as neglecting from years of being an upstanding honest person. He acquires a new character somewhere over time. Thus, practical identity is a moral feature of our experience used in judging the character of moral agents. By extension, this holds for a state.
Practically speaking, the United States is like Jones. When in times past if the United States called attention to human rights violations, then the world would listen. Now, the Junta in Burma are slapping down democracy and our want to call attention to this in international circles is defeated by our inconsistency on the one hand of judging others to be violators of human rights when at the same time the US cannot honor commitments of non-torture. This is an inconsistency in what we say we value from how we act. Our practical identity of a free nation is supplanted by the truer picture of our character. In essence, our practical identity is held as a salient feature for morally judging the US. This is a consequence of the inconsistency between a nation founded on the rule of law with those in power causing the split between the good principles we value from putting their wants ahead of what is truly morally good.
Following through on the deontological intuitions regarding torture
First, the link of absolute agreement:
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/01/opinion/01thu1.html?_r=1&ref=todayspaper&oref=slogin
The view I am going to espouse may seem practically absurd, but it is the one I share being a deontologist over a utilitarian. Before proceeding, I give a brief definition of the two. A deontologist is anyone who feels there are inviolable principles of duties that must be adhered to independent of consequences. Deontological principles are good for their own sake. A utilitarian is anyone who thinks principles of duty should try to maximize the greatest good for the greatest number of people.
Put another way, for the deontologist there are inviolable principles of morality that are independently objective, and should be adhered on their own intrinsic merit. These principles indicate what it is as a nation we value, and one of them is the rule of law above the political and tactical expediency that the promise of torure brings. Let's put this into the often cited example of a ticking time-bomb scenario so favorable to many pragmatic conservatives.
Suppose there is a ticking time-bomb, a nuclear bomb to be more precise. The bomb will destroy a major metropolitan city in the contiguous United States unless it is found. US police authorities have every justifiable reason for thinking that they have in their custody a person involved in the bombing plot. Further, let us concede that from a meta-perspective he truly is a fully knowledgeable participant in the concealing of the nuclear bomb. So far, Mr. X has been resistant to all conventional interrogation methods, and the detonation is just hours away. Do the police authorities now with impending nuclear calamity have justification to torture Mr. X since all avenues of interrogation have failed?
The principles embedded in the rule of law are constraints on what we can and cannot due when it comes to treating prisoners, people subjected to the due process of law. If due process is suspended, then the values of our law do not apply, and our failure to be consistent with the very same principles we endorse for our greatness are betrayed to the expedient. This is not an option since no one can make for them an exception to the demand of morality behind these principles, and as such, in keeping with the fairness principles of the rule of law, I put forward something like:
(1) Principles consistent with a fair rule of law prohibit the torture of any detainee.
From there, we move to our particular case:
(2) Mr. X is a detainee
Therefore, (3) Mr X should not be tortured
The tension here is that there are rights versus the possibly good consequences torture would engender---the safety of thousands of innocent civilians. Rights are inviolable, and no matter of interpretation or matters of convenience can get us past them. They form the values of what we as a society truly value, and those values are worth dying for since so much is put behind how enlightened our principles are. Do rights trump utility? I think they do, so here is the basic absurdity of this view that many Americans may not agree with.
By not torturing Mr. X, the authorities rightly lay claim to what is most valuable, the principles of fairness within our rule of law. If people die in this scenario, it is because the government chose rightly not to torture Mr. X. If all legitimate and moral manners of treatment of Mr. X led to the detonation of the nuclear device, then the government did all it could that was morally right in trying to rectify the scenario, and the preventable blood on the government's hands is the price we all pay for adhering to a morally fair rule of law.
One likely objection here is that I have reached an absurd conclusion. Certainly, consequences matter more than deontological prohibitions on one's actions since the consequentialist qua utilitarian would get us out of this scenario by choosing to torture Mr. X. The loss of so many can hardly be the greatest good for the greatest number.
My response is more formal. I think that consequentialist positions that try to bring about their state of affairs cannot reliably demonstrate how consequences will play out. Consequences take on a life of their own in human action, but what is controllable on our part as moral agents is that we can at least control the intention behind our actions. The deontological focus of intentions is within our power to judge what is good. Thus, the story goes that we judge what principles to adhere to, and conform our actions to those principles that ring true for all time.
Moreover, there is a plight attached to the utilitarian. For the utilitarian, it matters not if you use others as pawns to maximize the good for the greatest number. One could sacrifice another in this scheme for the greater good of the many even if it meant torturing one to save a city. Clearly, a single act of torture is wrong on any count, and as a deontologist, I bite the bullet on that account. On this view, morality is not something to be shed lightly simply as a matter of convenience.
Due-process rights are a culmination of two centuries of case law. They did not spring up over night, and they are very easily forgotten as the current situation with the Bush Administration easily shows. I hope this post has shown that practices like waterboarding or any other form of torture are wrong, and how torture looks from the deontological moral point of view.
Friday, September 21, 2007
Tasering of a University Student
Andrew Meyers seemed overzealous, enthusiastic and passionate about asking a question of a U.S. Senator. His agressive posturing at the question booth may have alarmed some security detail accompanying Senator Kerry, even if question period was over, and he really wanted in there. However, these two facts do not justify the tactless use of force with a stun gun. The free expression and exchange of ideas was haulted at University of Florida, Gainesville when Kerry by his inaction legitimized the use of violence. His voice sounded like a man transfixed and amazed at what transpired.
http://www.cnn.com/2007/US/09/18/student.tasered.ap/index.html
Now, the use of force by the police is not justified in the sense that through his passion to ask why did Kerry concede the 2004 Election he neglected to have a cooperative voice with the police officers. He only saw them taking him away, and the fact that he did nothing wrong as he emphatically states reinforces the stupidity of the police officers who have been suspended on administrative leave pending a ruling of an independent commission of some type or other. These officers should have had more capacity to calm him down. Perhaps, Kerry could have intervened with the microphone and informed the officers he felt in no real danger from a passionate youth upset at the results of the Bush reelection.
Universities are calm places where the pursuit of learning and growth of individuals is encouraged without hindrance of external forces. Any time violence is used on campuses anywhere the immediate intuition is why must that have to occur. Universities are sacred for their respite from the "real world". They are like secular churches and parents across the country entrust the safety of their young adult children to the forces that govern these institutions. If these forces violate the trust given to them, they must be held accountable for the transgression of violating trust, and here the transgression is in using violence to calm Meyers, the effect ripples throughout all universities where we empathize a great deal with what Meyers experienced.
Perhaps, it resonates on another abstract level for me since I knew people personally at Kent State. A best friend, and best-man to my wedding and wife both attended Kent State. Several professors at my school went to Kent State as well. Every May on the campus of Kent State there is a serious mentality of never-again, and public commemoration to continually remind a nation of the wrongness of violence against a citizenry at large, especially on a campus.
Violence is a breaking of order and peace. Order and peace are needed for any campus to support its mission as a learning environment. In addition, we must also ask what happens to political interrogation of public officials if the quaint procedures of discourse are not adhered to? Should we always abide by the time they give us, the public, (which is not long ever really) or should we make a serious inquiry of them when we really feel they must answer for what they have done?
http://www.cnn.com/2007/US/09/18/student.tasered.ap/index.html
Now, the use of force by the police is not justified in the sense that through his passion to ask why did Kerry concede the 2004 Election he neglected to have a cooperative voice with the police officers. He only saw them taking him away, and the fact that he did nothing wrong as he emphatically states reinforces the stupidity of the police officers who have been suspended on administrative leave pending a ruling of an independent commission of some type or other. These officers should have had more capacity to calm him down. Perhaps, Kerry could have intervened with the microphone and informed the officers he felt in no real danger from a passionate youth upset at the results of the Bush reelection.
Universities are calm places where the pursuit of learning and growth of individuals is encouraged without hindrance of external forces. Any time violence is used on campuses anywhere the immediate intuition is why must that have to occur. Universities are sacred for their respite from the "real world". They are like secular churches and parents across the country entrust the safety of their young adult children to the forces that govern these institutions. If these forces violate the trust given to them, they must be held accountable for the transgression of violating trust, and here the transgression is in using violence to calm Meyers, the effect ripples throughout all universities where we empathize a great deal with what Meyers experienced.
Perhaps, it resonates on another abstract level for me since I knew people personally at Kent State. A best friend, and best-man to my wedding and wife both attended Kent State. Several professors at my school went to Kent State as well. Every May on the campus of Kent State there is a serious mentality of never-again, and public commemoration to continually remind a nation of the wrongness of violence against a citizenry at large, especially on a campus.
Violence is a breaking of order and peace. Order and peace are needed for any campus to support its mission as a learning environment. In addition, we must also ask what happens to political interrogation of public officials if the quaint procedures of discourse are not adhered to? Should we always abide by the time they give us, the public, (which is not long ever really) or should we make a serious inquiry of them when we really feel they must answer for what they have done?
Sunday, July 29, 2007
Some introductory thoughts concerning Husserl
Concerning justificatory standpoints, human agents have two: the first-person standpoint, which I take to be phenomenology in the Husserlian sense and the third-person standpoint of the sciences. In Thomas Nagel's What is it like to be a bat?, Nagel observes the difficulty with reconciling the first person phenomenology with the objective viewpoint. He supports the belief that what is needed is a phenomenology based on the third-person viewpoint.
At present we are completely unequipped to think about the subjective character of experience without relying on the imagination-without taking up the point of view of the experiential subject. This should be regarded as a challenge to form new concepts and devise a new method-an objective phenomenology not dependent on empathy or the imagination.1
In the same vain, others have moved to eliminate the first-person standpoint altogether. Some are eliminativists like Dennett and Churchland. Each sees the first-person as problematic and inconsistent in providing insights into the nature of why we must either abandon completely or simply believe in the first-person pragmatically. They feel that neuroscience can account for subjectivity. For instance, Churchland writes:
Our mutual understanding and even our introspection may then be reconstituted within the conceptual framework of completed neuroscience, a theory we may expect to be more powerful by far than the common-sense psychology it displaces, and more substantially integrated within physical science generally.2
What each of these moves entails is a view of the first-person as incapable of moving beyond the realm of the subjective and offering an exact theoretical picture of what exactly is consciousness in the fullest objective sense. Since the first-person standpoint is incapable of providing an objective account, there must be a problem in that it cannot reach beyond itself. This makes it incapable of other possibilities, namely, intersubjectively demonstrating objective knowledge to others or that the other exists. Solipsism is a consequence of the skepticism concerning the first-person standpoint from the naturalistic third-person standpoint.
Thus, there are two issues at work here; two issues I see as inseparable. First, I see Husserl's suspension of the naturalistic attitude as an answer to the problems of wanting to eliminate the subjective, first-person standpoint altogether. I see his criticism and the phenomenological reduction as a corrective measure against this eliminative impulse. Secondly, the charge of solipsism is interrelated since if one keeps to the naturalistic attitude, then one will eventually opt for the naturalist position regarding how to explain agency.
1Nagel, Thomas, “What is it like to be a bat?” The Philosophical Review 83, No. 4. (Oct., 1974), pp. 449.
2 Churchland, Paul, “Eliminative Materialism and Propositional Attitudes.” Journal of Philosophy 78, No. 2 (Feb., 1981): pp. 67
Saturday, June 2, 2007
Emergent-Immanence
Dennett sees people as having propositional attitudes only as a useful fiction. It is a pragmatic move to suggest that other people have subjective experience of beliefs and desires. The subject is in no way constitutive of what is really going on inside our consciousness. Instead, we cannot even really talk of a genuinely existing inner mind, subjectivity or interiority---to do so commits one to the ontological absurdity of thinking of the first-person perspective as actually truly existing. The push to naturalize and ground consciousness in a way compatible with the physical sciences is where our philosophical commitment should lie.
I want to suggest a new, or perhaps older appropriation of Husserl's talk of the first-personal. Strictly speaking, I want to construct a theory of agency that centrally treats intentionality as a focal point from which all standpoints when facing the world are related through. Heidegger said famously "we are already under way." We are borne in a world set in motion from our own point of view. There is no other way to view the world except through our subjective experience. It is within phenomenology by turning to the immanent structures revealed in intentional experience that one can begin to see what is truly constitutive of the world. My knowledge is a product only because I am conscious of the world. It is this impulse I want to articulate somehow in Husserl that reverses the push to naturalize.
When viewed scientifically, everything about our human condition becomes easily reduced to parts without taking into consideration the immanently given in subjectivity. Reasons for this are many. First, talk of subjectivity as abstracted from the concrete experience of the world is seen as an aberration and leftover from the German Idealists. Subjectivity is metaphysical aloof and an impractical concept to hold in any contemp0rary metaphysics. Husserl connects up our transcendental reflection with the immanent, that is, with the concrete presentation of the world thrust upon us by its only forceful presence. There is nothing metaphysically aloof when concrete experience is joined to the transcendental.
Looking at the problem of agency, one finds it difficult, if not impossible, to sweep away the subjective. This is my main intuition. I am against calling the use of our language referring to beliefs and desires, as well as other areas of phenomenology, as useless fictions in the Dennettian sense. Instead, we do have feelings; we do have sensations, feelings, impressions, beliefs, attitudes and faculties. To ignore how we experience ourselves as a subjectivity fundamentally is absurd.
I want to suggest a new, or perhaps older appropriation of Husserl's talk of the first-personal. Strictly speaking, I want to construct a theory of agency that centrally treats intentionality as a focal point from which all standpoints when facing the world are related through. Heidegger said famously "we are already under way." We are borne in a world set in motion from our own point of view. There is no other way to view the world except through our subjective experience. It is within phenomenology by turning to the immanent structures revealed in intentional experience that one can begin to see what is truly constitutive of the world. My knowledge is a product only because I am conscious of the world. It is this impulse I want to articulate somehow in Husserl that reverses the push to naturalize.
When viewed scientifically, everything about our human condition becomes easily reduced to parts without taking into consideration the immanently given in subjectivity. Reasons for this are many. First, talk of subjectivity as abstracted from the concrete experience of the world is seen as an aberration and leftover from the German Idealists. Subjectivity is metaphysical aloof and an impractical concept to hold in any contemp0rary metaphysics. Husserl connects up our transcendental reflection with the immanent, that is, with the concrete presentation of the world thrust upon us by its only forceful presence. There is nothing metaphysically aloof when concrete experience is joined to the transcendental.
Looking at the problem of agency, one finds it difficult, if not impossible, to sweep away the subjective. This is my main intuition. I am against calling the use of our language referring to beliefs and desires, as well as other areas of phenomenology, as useless fictions in the Dennettian sense. Instead, we do have feelings; we do have sensations, feelings, impressions, beliefs, attitudes and faculties. To ignore how we experience ourselves as a subjectivity fundamentally is absurd.
Monday, January 29, 2007
Santa Fe
In the musical Rent, Tom Collins, an impoverished homosexual philosophy PhD in New York City, sings about leaving it all behind, retreating to Santa Fe. I have been feeling a similar pull, but opposite side of North America. I have decided that while being in Canada is fun and all, I cannot help but romanticize about opportunities never afforded to my slighted perception. As an American, there is no reason I cannot just pick up and move to New York. Part of me just wants to up and leave. Retreat, never come back!
Philosophy grows more and more consuming. I am at ease with it though. I am finding more and more reprogramming happening to my mind as I anticipate grading student papers for a "decent argument." I have accepted the analytic idea of a good argument as a pedagogical aim of philosophy itself, substituting what I once held stood for philosophy in terms of phenomenology. Once, I regarded philosophy the task of thinking prompted by wonder itself.
Retreating to NYC or hiking in the forests of the low mountains of the Eastern US is where I want to be now.
Just wishing for another world,
Ed
Philosophy grows more and more consuming. I am at ease with it though. I am finding more and more reprogramming happening to my mind as I anticipate grading student papers for a "decent argument." I have accepted the analytic idea of a good argument as a pedagogical aim of philosophy itself, substituting what I once held stood for philosophy in terms of phenomenology. Once, I regarded philosophy the task of thinking prompted by wonder itself.
Retreating to NYC or hiking in the forests of the low mountains of the Eastern US is where I want to be now.
Just wishing for another world,
Ed
Wednesday, December 13, 2006
Genetic Phenomenology
I am reading a book by Janet Donohoe. The title escapes me currently. However, the current interpretation of Husserl's later period to a genetic phenomenology allows for a dynamism and level of analysis that the static phenomenology of the early Husserl cannot. I am becoming increasingly aware of how intersubjectivity may factor into our moral reasoning. Allow me some space for leniency. I might not get this right the first time.
If moral realism is the position that values somehow exist independently of my mind, then the independence of moral values must subsist somehow. I am thinking that the intersubjective nature of moral experience may engender their reality. I think it is wrong to say that moral values exist as a natural kind since most attempts at reductionism of value fail our common-sense intuitions of moral values. Values seem incommensurable, but they must -- like all things -- be caused in some manner.
I could be completely off base here. Only time will tell, and right now, I wish I spoke and read German having access to the Husserl Archives at Leuven.
VP
If moral realism is the position that values somehow exist independently of my mind, then the independence of moral values must subsist somehow. I am thinking that the intersubjective nature of moral experience may engender their reality. I think it is wrong to say that moral values exist as a natural kind since most attempts at reductionism of value fail our common-sense intuitions of moral values. Values seem incommensurable, but they must -- like all things -- be caused in some manner.
I could be completely off base here. Only time will tell, and right now, I wish I spoke and read German having access to the Husserl Archives at Leuven.
VP
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)