Thursday, May 7, 2009

Phenomenology of Ownership

I want to know what it is for the agent to own their action. In some sense, this is a phenomenological appeal made in many stripes. From Kantians to utilitarians, there is the implicit assumption that the agent is connected through ownership to the action they bring about. The Kantians ground their moral thought in intentions, and utilitarians focus on the consequences brought about by action. Yet, both think ownership primitively basic.

What is it though for ownership to be? Where does the sense of ownership come about? Is it connected to our embodiment? In what ways does our pre-reflective life give rise to the fact that we own our action?

Ownership is such a basic notion that ethics of any stripe could not succeed in terms of its question if people did not own their actions.


Erik Winther Paisley said...

Did you ever expand on these thoughts?

Carbondale Chasmite said...

Not in any systematic way. I just completed my dissertation on the phenomenology of value in Scheler's thought. I will be taking up his conception of the person in the near future, and in some ways, these questions are connected to that exploration.